
MyReport Updater Flaws Expose gRPC-to-SYSTEM Paths: What Admins Should Check
Quarkslab disclosed two vulnerabilities in Report One MyReport Updater 2.1.1: unauthenticated remote code execution through a reachable gRPC service and local privilege escalation through the SYSTEM updater service.1 The CVE records mark MyReport Updater versions through 2.1.1 as affected.23
CONTAIN, VERIFY, THEN REPLACE • Reporting cutoff: October 27, 2026, 11:32 a.m. EDT / 15:32 UTC
The bottom line
Treat a host as remotely exposed when all of these are true: MyReport Updater 2.1.1 or earlier is installed, MyReportUpdaterService is present and running, an attacker can reach TCP 9095, and the updater can make outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure.1 The local issue instead requires a low-privileged foothold that can interact with the updater path.3
Verified facts
What happened
MyReport Updater includes a Windows service named MyReportUpdaterService running as LocalSystem and a manager that controls it. Quarkslab found version 2.1.1 accepting gRPC requests on TCP 9095 and allowing the reference server and installation behavior to be changed.1
For CVE-2026-110632, a reachable unauthenticated caller can invoke UpdateConfigReferent to repoint the updater toward attacker-controlled infrastructure. If the target updater can reach that infrastructure, the update mechanism can be abused for SYSTEM-level file write and code execution.12 For CVE-2026-110633, a low-privileged local user can misuse the SYSTEM service to install attacker-supplied archives in arbitrary locations and escalate privileges.3
Severity without score mixing
| Issue | VulnCheck CVSS v4.0 | VulnCheck CVSS v3.1 | Attack position |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-110632 | 9.2 Critical | 8.1 High | Network; prerequisites present |
| CVE-2026-110633 | 8.5 High | 7.8 High | Local; low privileges |
These values use different CVSS generations and vectors, so they should not be flattened into one score. VulnCheck’s advisories and CNA records publish both sets.2345 As of CISA KEV catalog version 2026.10.26, released October 26 at 22:24 UTC, neither CVE appears in the catalog.6 Catalog absence does not show that exploitation has not occurred, and this article makes no active-exploitation claim.
Fix and release status
The CVE records define the affected range as versions through 2.1.1.23 Quarkslab’s updated disclosure timeline says MyReport v8 shipped October 13 and MyReport Updater 3.0.2 followed October 15, adding signed update-package verification and named-pipe communication.1 Current vendor updater documentation likewise describes a local named pipe restricted to signed MyReport executables and digital-signature verification for archives.7
Do not assume the suite major version proves the updater fix. The public vendor pages reviewed at the cutoff describe MyReport 8 and the newer updater architecture, but they do not name both CVEs or explicitly map them to Updater 3.0.2.78 Obtain the vendor- or solution-provider-confirmed remediated updater build for your deployment and verify the updater’s own file/package version.
Inventory safely on Windows
Run these checks locally through your normal administrative tooling. They inspect service, process, package and listener state without changing configuration; the service and updater names follow current vendor documentation.7
# Service identity, state, account and executable command line
$svc = Get-CimInstance Win32_Service -Filter "Name='MyReportUpdaterService'"
$svc | Select-Object Name, State, StartName, PathName, ProcessId
# Running executable and exact file version, when the service is active
if ($svc -and $svc.ProcessId -gt 0) {
$proc = Get-Process -Id $svc.ProcessId -ErrorAction Stop
$file = Get-Item -LiteralPath $proc.Path
$file | Select-Object FullName, Length, LastWriteTime
$file.VersionInfo | Select-Object FileVersion, ProductVersion, CompanyName
}
# Installed-package records in 64-bit and 32-bit registry views
$uninstall = @(
'HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*',
'HKLM:\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*'
)
Get-ItemProperty $uninstall -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object DisplayName -Match 'MyReport.*Updater' |
Select-Object DisplayName, DisplayVersion, Publisher, InstallLocation
# Local TCP 9095 listeners, including IPv4/IPv6 bind addresses and owning process
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Listen -LocalPort 9095 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, OwningProcess
A listener proves only that the port is open locally. Review Windows Firewall rules, network firewalls, VLAN/zone routing, VPN access, NAT and both IPv4 and IPv6 paths to determine who can actually reach it. Do not launch external scanning from the public internet; validate only within authorized networks.
Practical containment and remediation priorities
- Preserve short-retention evidence while containing. Save relevant service, firewall, endpoint, proxy/DNS and updater logs before restart, redeployment or cleanup where feasible.9
- Block TCP 9095 from untrusted networks and unnecessary internal segments. Apply host and network controls, checking IPv4 and IPv6. If the service is not required, isolate the host while the owner confirms a safe replacement.
- Restrict updater egress. Allow only expected vendor or organization-controlled update endpoints after operational validation; a broad outbound block can break legitimate updating.
- Obtain the confirmed remediated updater. Contact MyReport or the solution provider, record the updater-specific fixed build, deploy it across every embedded or branded installation, and restart or replace the service as instructed.
- Verify behavior, not only a version string. Confirm the new file/package version is active, stale processes are gone, unnecessary TCP 9095 listeners are absent or tightly scoped, expected updates still work, and secondary hosts are covered.
Detection and incident response
Review unexpected source addresses connecting to TCP 9095, unplanned changes to reference-server or updater configuration, updater egress to unknown destinations, unusual module archives, unexpected file writes and abnormal child-process activity.1 These are triage indicators, not proof of exploitation; the public sources reviewed do not provide a unique compromise indicator.
If SYSTEM-level execution is suspected, contain the host while preserving volatile and short-retention evidence, investigate service-account use, persistence and lateral movement, and scope affected systems.9 Rotate affected secrets from a known-clean system only after scope is understood. If SYSTEM execution is confirmed, consider rebuilding from trusted media rather than treating an updater replacement alone as actor eviction.
Post-change verification
- Re-run the service, process and package checks and retain the exact updater version and file provenance.
- Confirm any TCP 9095 listener is gone or limited to the intended local/trusted boundary across IPv4 and IPv6.
- Verify firewall and egress rules from each relevant network zone, without public exploit testing.
- Exercise one normal update workflow and confirm signatures, logs and service health remain normal.
- Check embedded deployments, Citrix/session hosts, golden images and dormant replicas so an older updater is not reintroduced.
Disclosure timeline
Quarkslab says it sent the technical report in November 2025, coordinated with the vendor and CERT-FR through 2026, published on October 13, and recorded CVE assignment on October 14 and the Updater 3.0.2 release on October 15.1
Sources
- MyReport Updater: From gRPC to SYSTEM — Lucas Laise, Quarkslab, October 13, 2026; live page rechecked October 27.
- CVE-2026-110632 record — CVE Program / VulnCheck CNA, October 14, 2026.
- CVE-2026-110633 record — CVE Program / VulnCheck CNA, October 14, 2026.
- CVE-2026-110632 advisory — VulnCheck.
- CVE-2026-110633 advisory — VulnCheck.
- Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog — CISA, catalog version 2026.10.26.
- Installation with MyReport Updater — MyReport vendor documentation, accessed October 27, 2026.
- MyReport 8.0: the most capable version to date — MyReport, updated October 16, 2026.
- Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity — CISA and partner agencies.
Update note: Source and catalog status were rechecked through October 27, 2026, 11:32 a.m. EDT. No exploit code, payloads, malicious paths or reproduction steps are included.
